Pool photo via Tingshu Wang/Associated Press
Bring the bottom line forward
The United States made a binding commitment to defend the Kingdom of Bahrain, an important Arab state in the Persian Gulf, in return for the unwavering support of U.S. regional policies and interests. Bahrain is the only Arab state publicly participating in the U.S.-led Red Sea Security Operation, organized to thwart attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis. Bahrain is one of the moderate Arab states that global diplomats hope will contribute forces to a multilateral interim peacekeeping operation once the Gaza conflict ends. The Bahraini government’s crackdown on dissent and outreach to China remain a concern for U.S. and allied officials.
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have been key security partners of the United States since U.S. officials mobilized regional and global allies to launch a military campaign to reverse Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Since then, Iran has emerged as the greatest threat to the United States and the Gulf states, especially following the U.S.-led toppling of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. Leaders of the Kingdom of Bahrain, one of the smallest and least wealthy of the Gulf states, perceive the greatest threat from the Islamic Republic of Iran than any other Gulf or Arab state.
In 1981 and 1996, the government accused Iranian leaders of orchestrating failed coups against Bahrain’s leaders, and Bahraini authorities blamed Iran for inciting the kingdom’s majority Shiite Muslims to rise up against the country’s leaders during the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. U.S. and international officials have broadly criticized the government’s crackdown on Shiite protesters while later acknowledging that Iranian-backed underground groups, particularly the Al-Ashtar Brigades, have carried out violent attacks against Bahrain’s police and security forces, designating them as terrorists and imposing sanctions on them.
The government of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, perhaps more than any other Gulf or Arab state, has come under the umbrella of U.S.-led security and placed few or no conditions on the partnership. The king and his son, Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, have not publicly expressed any doubts about the durability and scope of the U.S. commitment to regional security expressed by ally Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ). Bahrain’s leadership has not imposed any conditions on the U.S. Regional Naval Command assets, which Bahrain has been headquartered in since 1946, even though many U.S. policies have angered the country’s population, including Shiites and the government-majority Sunni minority.
Bahrain, home to the naval headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), known as NAVCENT, is critical to U.S. efforts to contain Iran and its Axis of Resistance partners, including Yemen’s Houthi movement. NAVCENT assets have led multinational efforts to disrupt and degrade attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by intercepting shipments of weapons and technology to the Houthis from Tehran, the Houthis’ main backer.
Bahrain is the only Arab country to have openly participated in Operation Guardian of Prosperity, a maritime security mission formed in December 2023 to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi missile and armed drone attacks. Twenty countries are participating in the operation, of which 12 have been publicly announced, including Bahrain. According to some reports, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may also be contributing to the mission, but are trying to keep their participation private so as not to trigger a resumption of Houthi attacks on energy and civilian infrastructure. The two countries are also trying to avoid the risk of further destabilization in the Red Sea, where many of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects are located. Moreover, Saudi and UAE leaders calculate that openly supporting US military activities against the Houthis would reignite tensions with Iran. Both countries have been trying to improve relations with Tehran for the past four years. Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a formal agreement to restore relations in March 2023.
Unwilling to defy their Gulf allies by resisting detente with Tehran, Bahraini leaders agreed in late June to begin talks to repair political ties between the two countries that were severed in 2016 in solidarity with the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic dispute. The effort to improve ties was announced after Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani met with his country’s Acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani during his visit to Iran. Al Zayani was in Iran to attend the Asia Cooperation Dialogue Summit. The meeting came after Bahrain requested, via Russia in early June, to re-establish diplomatic ties with Iran. In May, Bahrain’s King Hamad said his country looked forward to improved relations with Iran.
Even before the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, which sparked the war in Gaza and the Houthi offensive in the Red Sea, U.S. officials recognized Bahrain’s centrality to the U.S. security architecture in the Gulf, signing a bilateral Comprehensive Security, Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) in September 2023. The agreement goes beyond existing U.S. security agreements with Bahrain and other Gulf states by committing the U.S. to defend Bahrain if attacked. According to the agreement text, “any external aggression or threat of external aggression against the sovereignty, independence or territorial integrity of any Party shall be deemed to be an injunction by any State … [United States and Bahrain] “This is a matter of grave concern to the other Contracting Parties. In the event of external aggression or a threat of external aggression against any Contracting Party, the Contracting Parties shall immediately meet at the highest level, in accordance with their respective constitutions and laws, to determine their additional defense needs and to develop and implement appropriate defense and deterrence responses, including in the economic, military, and/or political domains, as determined by the Contracting Parties.”
C-SIPA goes far beyond the vague, non-binding U.S. security commitments to Bahrain codified in the Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), signed a few months after the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991. In contrast to the DCA, the new pact includes provisions for expanded economic cooperation. C-SIPA’s terms stipulate that the two countries will “identify strategic investment opportunities that benefit multiple parties and develop projects that enhance bilateral and multilateral economic and trade cooperation, including in the areas of supply chain resilience and infrastructure, and support global economic development.”
The US decision to pledge protection to Bahrain also reflects Bahrain’s alignment with other Arab countries, including its close Gulf ally the UAE, in joining the Abraham Accords and opening formal diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020. US officials appreciate that Bahrain’s leaders continue to uphold their commitments under the agreements, even as the majority of Bahrainis condemn Israel’s actions in Gaza. Since October 7, several large anti-Israel demonstrations have been held in Manama calling on the king to sever ties with Israel. At the same time, Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups have criticized the government’s use of repressive tactics to suppress Palestine solidarity protesters. In response to the US’s strong support for Bahrain, US officials appear to expect it to contribute some of its security forces to a potential interim multinational peacekeeping force in Gaza that could be deployed after Israel withdraws. In late July, the UAE became the first Arab country to signal its intention to contribute troops to the Gaza peacekeeping mission.
Yet, like some Gulf allies, Bahraini officials risk criticism from U.S. leaders for expanding ties with China. U.S. leaders have not opposed Gulf efforts to expand ties with Beijing, but have made sales of some U.S. advanced technologies, especially military equipment, conditional on firm commitments to block Chinese access. In that context, it is of concern that King Hamad signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with China during his visit to Beijing in May to attend the Forum for China-Arab States Cooperation. During the visit, Bahrain’s Mumtalakat Sovereign Wealth Fund and China Investment Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding to explore mutual investment opportunities. In 2018, Bahrain signed a memorandum of understanding to join Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, no specific deal between Bahrain and China has provoked U.S. public opposition.
